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AGAINST ALL ENFMIES—
USING COUNTER DRUG OPERATIONS
To Train For Infantry Wartime Missions

A Monograph
by
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This monograph describes how infantry units can use counterdrug operations to conduct unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) training. The flow of illegal drugs into the United States threatens our way of life. On September 18, 1989 the Secretary of Defense directed the Combatant Commanders to elevate the priority of counterdrug operations within their commands. Since this message legitimized the role of the armed services in the counterdrug war it is imperative that army units understand how to integrate counterdrug tasks into their training plans. This monograph explains how infantry commanders can use counterdrug missions to complement training on current unit METLs and thereby improve their unit combat readiness.

The monograph outlines the National Drug Control Strategy. It then shows how that strategy translates into military missions. The monograph explains the nation's three lines of defense against illegal drug traffic. It also tells how the Army Counternarcotic Plan supports the national strategy to reduce the distribution of illegal drugs.

The monograph proposes three scenarios that require infantry units to assist civilian law enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug operations. At the end of each scenario is an explanation of how the infantry commander can use the 'Battle Focus' training process to translate counterdrug tasks into wartime tasks. By following established training regulations infantry soldiers can receive wartime training while reducing the threat to our national security caused by the flow of illegal drugs.

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I. Introduction

. . .do solemnly swear to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic. . . .1

All soldiers swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States of America when entering the country's Armed Forces. The oath affirms the soldier's willingness to defend the country against any internal or external threat to the national security. Traditionally this meant the soldier was willing to engage in combat against any armed force that threatened America's sovereignty or interests. However, the September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy identified a new threat to our way of life. That document, signed by President George Bush, stated that the flow of illegal drugs represents one of the gravest threats to our national security.² Today's soldiers and their leaders face a dilemma. They must assist in the battle against this unconventional threat that is slowly destroying our country while maintaining a state of combat readiness that will continue to deter armed aggression America or her allies. The purpose of this monograph is to explain how Army infantry units can train for wartime missions while performing counterdrug operations.

The Department of Defense (DoD) Guidance concerning the National Drug Control Strategy echoed President Bush's concern that the flow of illegal drugs was threatening the American way of life. In his 18 September 1989 letter to the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney stated that the supply of illicit drugs, the violence and instability associated with their distribution, and the use of the illegal drugs by American citizens posed a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. Secretary Cheney declared the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of drugs a high priority mission for the Department of Defense. He directed the Combatant Commanders to elevate the priority for counterdrug operations within their commands.³

To understand how the flow of illegal drugs threatens our national Security, we must first review the interests and objectives defined in our National Security Strategy. Our National Military Strategy flows from that document. In the 1991 National Security Strategy, the president groups America's interests into four broad areas:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation.

- A healthy and growing United States economy.

-- Healthy and cooperative political relations with allies and friendly nations.

-- A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. 4

Illegal drugs threaten United States interests in a number of ways. They undermine the political, military, social, and economic systems of our country. Illegal drug production and distribution threaten our political relations by weakening governments friendly to the United States. Drug traffickers undermine legitimate foreign governments via corruption, intimidation, and economic destabilization. Drug producers are often linked to insurgent movements that cause political problems in their country. The distribution of illegal drugs also has a direct impact on the United States military which must contend with degradations in military readiness caused by drug abuse. Drug related violence also threatens United States officials, servicemembers, and their families. The threat of narcoterrorism is a constant concern for personnel serving overseas. "

The flow of illegal drugs into the United States places a heavy burden on our social and economic systems. The United States has the highest percentage of drug abuse by high school age youth in the world. Intravenous drug use is the single largest source of HIV/AIDS infections. Drug abuse drains the American

economy by increasing health care costs. Each year the government must subsidize the care of over 200,000 infants born to mothers who abused drugs. Drug abuse also hurts the economy by causing lowered productivity in the workplace. When one adds these liabilities to the \$200 billion dollars drug users spend on illegal drugs each year, it is evident that illegal drugs place a strain on the American economy.* There is no single drug problem but rather a multitude of problems caused by the sophisticated infrastructure that produces and distributes illegal drugs.

There is no common pattern to the structure of the drug trafficking organizations. Drug trafficking organizations may range from major international cartels to city based streets gangs. The drug cartels vary in size, location, target audience, and product. The organizations only interact when both can profit from the combined effort. One feature that is common to all drug organizations is the ability to tap alternate sources of supply and to change their distribution patterns. The ability to alter their patterns enables the larger drug organizations to regroup and redirect their efforts with only minor disruptions to their overall operations.

The international cartels are sophisticated organizations that can operate across international borders. They often have the ability to form limited

partnerships with other groups to accomplish specific goals. City based gangs have a less sophisticated organizational structure. The management function of organized street gangs is usually limited to a few individuals. However, the distribution function is usually accomplished by a large number of street operatives. At the low end of the drug trafficking spectrum is the outlaw gang. These organizations, such as motorcycle gangs, only handle a small amount of the illegal drug trade. Instead of large profit, these organizations use drug trafficking as a way to maintain a subsistence level of existence.⁷

Drug abuse is not a new problem in the United States. The first documented episode of widespread drug abuse in our country came at the end of the Civil War. Veterans of the war easily became addicted to morphine, which was widely used as a pain killer. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, Americans abused drugs such as opium and heroin. In the 1960s the country experienced a drug abuse explosion. Drugs such as marijuana, LSD, PCP, and amphetamines grew in popularity. In the 1980s the dangerous narcotic cocaine became the most popular illegal drug.⁸

The United States government was not prepared for what would become known as the "War on Drugs." Most citizens and government officials viewed the illegal drug

trade as a law enforcement problem. Congress channeled over 75% of the funds dedicated to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the law enforcement network. Unfortunately, no one drug law enforcement agency was able to take the lead in counterdrug operations. There was a great deal of competition among the different counterdrug factions.⁹

The president's National Drug Control Strategy highlights the fact that the counterdrug battle must be fought on every front. Most of the illegal drugs that flow into the United States come from six geographic regions: the Golden Triangle in southeast Asia, the Golden Crescent in south and southwest Asia, the Bekka Valley in eastern Lebanon, the Andean ridge in South America, Central America, and the United States.¹⁰ Curtailing the flow of illegal drugs in the United States will require the combined efforts of federal, state, and local authorities. It is no wonder that President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy calls for all segments of the federal government and American society to join in the fight to reduce the amount of illegal drugs infesting America.¹¹

II. The Army's Counterdrug Strategy

Until 1989 the Department of Defense only played a minor role in the war on drugs. Although the President saw the drug problem as a threat to national security, Congress was hesitant to increase the military's role in the drug war. The Posse Comitatus Act, signed in 1878, reflects the government's long standing tradition of limiting military involvement in civilian affairs. The Posse Comitatus Act limits the military's ability to enforce civilian law unless authorized by an Act of Congress. Although the language of the act only addresses the use of the Army and the Air Force, the Department of Defense insists the Navy and Marine Corps abide by the Posse Comitatus Act as a matter of policy. The Posse Comitatus Act only applies to active and reserve units operating in CONUS. It does not apply to National Guard units or to military activities on foreign soil.

There are two constitutional exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In an emergency situation the President can use the military to prevent the loss of life or destruction of property. The President can also use the military to protect federal property when local authorities are unable to provide protection. Both exceptions stem from the President's right to preserve

order and protect the public.¹²

In response to the growing law enforcement burden associated with the flow of illegal drugs, Congress modified the Posse Comitatus Act to allow the military to provide more support to civilian law enforcement agencies. The modification, made in 1989, allows the military to provide training, advice, equipment, and facilities to civilian law enforcement agencies. It also allows the use of selected military personnel to support counterdrug operations. However, it is still against the law for military personnel to participate directly in searches, seizures, and arrests.¹³

When Secretary of Defense Cheney issued the Department of Defense guidance elevating the priority of counterdrug missions within the Combatant Commands, he made counterdrug operations a legitimate mission for America's armed forces. Secretary Cheney directed the warfighting commanders in chief (CINCs) to combat the flow of illegal drugs at every phase of their flow. He proposed a strategy that would use three lines of defense to interdict the flow of illegal drugs: in countries that are the source of the drugs, in transit to the United States, and in the distribution system within the United States.¹⁴

Attacking the flow of illegal drugs at their source would be America's 'first line of defense' in the

counterdrug war. The Secretary's guidance stated that United States armed forces could assist foreign countries in training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, logistics, and civic actions that would help those countries combat drug producing organizations within their borders. In addition to training and nation-building the Secretary's guidance cleared the way for United States forces to combat the export of drugs from cooperating allied nations by assisting those nations in their intelligence collection efforts.

The second line of defense against the flow of illegal drugs would be to confiscate the drugs while they were in transit to the United States. The primary mission of forces dedicated to this second line of defense would be to interdict and deter the flow of illegal drugs before they crossed the border into the United States. Forces used to attack the drugs while in transit would have the added effect of increasing the logistical difficulties, costs, and risks for the drug traffickers.

The final line of defense envisioned by Secretary Cheney was the attack on drugs within the United States. Within the United States, military forces would assist federal, state, and local agencies with training, reconnaissance, command and control, equipment loans, planning, and logistical support to counterdrug

operations. Secretary Cheney made it clear that the military command structure should develop administrative procedures that allowed a rapid response to requests for assistance from law enforcement agencies.¹⁵

Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone published the Army Counternarcotics Plan on 17 April, 1990. Secretary Stone stated that the Army's primary role in counterdrug operations would be to support the Department of Defense mission to detect and monitor the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. To support this mission, Secretary Stone directed Army commanders to be prepared to provide forces that would assist combatant commanders in developing and executing plans to employ the unique assets of Army forces in counterdrug operations and to provide equipment, training, and personnel to other government agencies and selected foreign allies to counter illegal drug production, trafficking, and use.¹⁶

Secretary Stone parroted Secretary Cheney's guidance that counterdrug operations would be a high priority mission for Army forces. He directed Army commanders to execute the counterdrug mission with the same dedication, skill, and professionalism applied to other national security missions. He envisioned that Army support to counterdrug operations would fall into two broad categories. The first category was the dedication of

Army assets to non-Department of Defense agencies and selected foreign governments. The second category was providing forces and equipment to warfighting CINC's for support, training, and operations.¹⁷

Secretary Stone's concept for providing forces to support counterdrug operations was for commanders to conduct a mission analysis to determine what capability the requesting agency needed and provide that agency with a stand-alone Army support package. The unit tasked to provide the support package would coordinate all activities necessary to accomplish the mission. Secretary Stone's guidance emphasized the Army's ability to gather tactical intelligence for law enforcement agencies. He also stated that Army administrative procedures and regulations would still apply to those units loaning assets to drug law enforcement agencies. However, he warned that Army commanders should avoid long term support agreements with drug enforcement organizations.

The Army Counternarcotics Plan states that Army forces provided to combatant commanders, to support counterdrug operations, must always be under direct military command and should be employed in accordance with Army doctrine. Secretary Stone's guidance authorized Army units to provide mobile training teams to train domestic and foreign law enforcement officials and

to provide operational support to foreign countries. Nevertheless, he urged commanders to minimize the impact on combat readiness caused by diverting training time to counterdrug operations.¹⁰

A key facet of the Army's plan involves the use of military forces to provide security for law enforcement agencies conducting raids on illegal drug activities. The Army plan states that military forces can be used for this mission both at home and overseas. The plan also directs commanders to assist host nation governments in planning for the employment and resourcing of these forces. As part of this new mission, commanders must plan for the support structures necessary to receive and sustain military forces involved in security operations. The majority of the Army soldiers available to perform the counterdrug missions directed by Secretary Stone belong to Commander in Chief Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Commander in Chief Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Secretary Cheney directed the FORSCOM Commander to develop a plan to provide forces to support the counterdrug efforts of United States law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments. To accomplish this mission, the FORSCOM Commander developed a plan that focuses support along five vectors: operational support, intelligence support, planning support, training support, and demand reduction.

Operational support is FORSCOM's largest support vector. It includes ground reconnaissance, ground and air transportation for law enforcement agencies, intelligence and communication networks, and command and control systems. Intelligence support is the second largest area of FORSCOM support to civilian agencies. Intelligence support focuses on improving civilian collection and dissemination efforts. Planning support includes providing administrative support for counterdrug operations. Training support absorbs the smallest part of the FORSCOM budget but the FORSCOM Commander feels it will be the most effective means of improving drug agent efficiency and safety when operating in a hostile environment.¹⁰

The Secretary of Defense ordered the USSOUTHCOM Commander to develop a plan to combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in conjunction with cooperating host countries in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility. To accomplish this mission, USSOUTHCOM is focusing its effort in the Andean Ridge area of South America. The main challenge for USSOUTHCOM is to ensure that United States support does not adversely affect the development of democratic institutions in the host countries. Consequently, soldiers assigned to USSOUTHCOM can expect to be involved in nation building efforts such as providing security to rural areas, engineer support,

medical support, and programs designed to support the local law enforcement infrastructure.²⁰

Secretary Cheney warned military leaders that the uncertainties associated with the counterdrug mission require the careful evaluation of peacetime rules of engagement. The rules of engagement have to fit the limits of the Posse Comitatus Act while allowing soldiers the right to use deadly force for self defense.

Protecting Army soldiers from the violence associated with the transportation and distribution of illegal drugs was a major concern of the Secretary of the Army.

Secretary Stone realized Army units could come face to face with armed drug traffickers. His counternarcotics guidance tells Army commanders that forces providing support to counterdrug operations may face armed adversaries and should be prepared to defend themselves even when conducting training, surveillance, or other non-combat operations.²¹

III. Counterdrug Operations and Wartime Training

Secretary Stone was very specific concerning the training of Army personnel for counterdrug operations. His April 1990 guidance stated that the principles in Field Manual 25-100 Training the Force would be used to execute training requirements. Field Manual 25-100

describes the standardized training doctrine used throughout the Army. If the missions requested by supported law enforcement agencies did not relate to wartime missions, commanders were to employ the 'Battle Focus' training concept to minimize any degradation of combat readiness caused by training for counterdrug missions. Figure 1 outlines the Battle Focus training process.²²

Battle focused training is the Army's process to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. The purpose of battle focused training is to ensure that Army units train to meet wartime mission requirements. Army leaders realize that units cannot train to proficiency on every wartime task. Battle focused training allows unit leaders to attain combat proficiency by focusing their training efforts on the tasks that are essential to success in their wartime combat missions. Congressional legislation requires the supported law enforcement agency to reimburse the Army for resources expended to support counterdrug operations unless the support is part of normal military training and operations or the benefit derived by Army personnel supporting the operation is equivalent to that received during normal Army training.²³

The Battle Focus Training Process leads to the development of a unit Mission Essential Task List (METL).




Figure 1. Battle Focus Training Process

The METL is an unconstrained statement of the tasks required for the unit to accomplish its wartime missions. Although resource availability does not affect METL development, commanders must recognize the peacetime training limitations placed on Army units. If a unit commander cannot execute all the tasks on his METL, he must confer with the next higher wartime commander to make the changes necessary to ensure his wartime mission and his unit METL are consistent. It is the unit commander's responsibility to identify those tasks that are essential to the unit's wartime mission. Not all

tasks come directly from war plans. Commanders may also derive tasks from external directives such as Mission Training Plans. An example of infantry unit METLs is at Figure 2.²⁴

The Army Counternarcotics Plan requires Army units to develop Mission Essential Task Lists for counterdrug operations. The task list for counterdrug operations would become part of the unit's overall collective training plan. Secretary Stone also encouraged units to integrate drug law enforcement agencies into their counterdrug operations training plans. He also stated that whenever possible units should conduct wartime training or counterdrug operations in high intensity drug trafficking areas.²⁵

Before an infantry unit commander can analyze his wartime missions and integrate counterdrug operations into his METL, he must understand how counterdrug operations fit into the spectrum of conflict. Field Manual 100-5 Operations, one of the Army's warfighting manuals, emphasizes the need for Army units to be able to execute military operations commensurate with political objectives across a wide spectrum of possible conflicts. Counterdrug operations are a part of warfighting that the Army categorizes as Low Intensity Conflict. Low Intensity Conflict is unique because it pits Army forces against forces and organizations that pose a threat to

Sample Infantry Division METL

- Move by road/rail to APOE/SPOE
- Draw POMCUS equipment and supplies
- Move to assembly area and assemble the force
- Deploy to combat area of operations
- Conduct hasty attack
- Conduct mobile defense
- Conduct river crossing operations
- Protect the rear area
- Rearm and fix forward, and refuel while on the
move

Sample Infantry Battalion METL

- Move by road/rail to APOE/SPOE
- Perform tactical road march
- Occupy assembly area
- Defend
- Move tactically
- Attack/counterattack by fire
- Conduct assault

Figure 2: Example of Infantry METLs

United States interests at all times. Therefore Army forces can be called upon to conduct these operations at anytime and not just during periods of declared hostility.²⁶

Military forces involved in counterdrug operations may be called upon to conduct a variety of counterdrug missions. For the past two years, military support to counterdrug operations has been one of the major issues in the Army Focus. The Army Focus provides Army leaders with a view of the key issues facing the Army.²⁷ Field Manual 100-2 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict characterizes counterdrug operations as Peacetime Contingency Operations.

Peacetime Contingency Operations are politically sensitive military activities that require the rapid, short-term employment of military forces in conditions short of war. Peacetime Contingency Operations include Security Assistance and support to United States Civil Authorities. The use of military forces in Peacetime Contingency Operations complement political objectives as opposed to contingency operations in wartime which complement military objectives.²⁸ Therefore Army doctrine already recognizes that military support to counterdrug operations can include:

- Mobile Training Teams
- Offshore training

- Advisory personnel
- Logistics support (materiel, maintenance, resupply, and transportation)
- Civic Action
- Information, detection, and surveillance operations
- Intelligence support

Infantry commanders can expect their counterdrug missions to fall into one of three mission areas. Military forces may be called upon to disrupt or canalize the flow of illegal drugs, provide security for law enforcement agents conducting drug raids, or assist in the detection and destruction of drug production materials. The three most likely scenarios involving these missions are:

- Deploy and conduct training missions along the southwest border of the United States in order to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs.
- Linkup and provide security for law enforcement agents conducting raids on domestic or foreign drug production/distribution facilities.
- Assist in domestic or foreign crop eradication operations.

Each scenario provides infantry commanders the opportunity to integrate training on METL tasks into his counterdrug mission.

The first scenario would require the infantry

commander to deploy to a specified area of operations in the southwest United States. While in the area, assigned by the supported agency, he would conduct military training in an area where his unit's presence would complement specific counterdrug operations. Although the training would focus on wartime METL it would assist in counterdrug operations by denying drug dealers the opportunity to use the area to funnel drugs into the United States. The unit may also be called upon to assist in counterdrug operations by reconnoitering known drug movement routes, observing suspected illegal activities, or verifying the location of drug production or distribution facilities.

The prudent commander can use this scenario to train on several of his METL tasks. Meeting the mission requirements of this scenario requires the unit to assemble equipment and supplies, deploy to the area of operations, and conduct the specified training or security mission. While in the area of operations, the infantry unit would protect the forces and supplies deployed throughout the area and conduct operations to sustain its personnel and equipment. These requirements mirror several of the wartime METL found in Figure 2. Although the conditions may not be as hostile as those expected in a wartime environment, the unit commander can adjust the standards for successful completion of these

tasks to reflect the proficiency necessary for success in combat.

The second scenario would require the infantry unit to provide security for drug law enforcement operations. The infantry unit would deploy to an operating base where they would link up with foreign or domestic law enforcement officials who are planning to conduct a raid targeted against an illegal drug activity. The counterdrug mission during this scenario would be for the infantry unit to provide security around the perimeter of the objective area. The infantry unit might also be required to assist in the security of ammunition, supplies, and equipment in the rear area. The rules of engagement will most likely limit his use of deadly force to self defense situations.

This scenario provides many opportunities for training on tasks found in a unit's METL. In addition to the tasks identified in the first scenario, this scenario gives the infantry unit commander the opportunity to practice METL directly related to combat operations. This scenario gives an infantry unit commander the opportunity to train in a hostile environment. Units will have to recon the objective area, develop an operations order, and occupy defensive positions. Occupying those positions will allow the commander to practice tactical movement by land and sometimes by air

assault. When conducting counterdrug operations in a potentially hostile environment, soldiers will be conducting conventional defensive operations.

The third scenario involving the use of infantry units to support counterdrug operations is the use of military manpower to assist in crop eradication. Like the first scenario the unit may be operating on foreign or domestic soil. Eradication operations would require the infantry unit to deploy to an area and assist drug law enforcement agents in locating and destroying plants used in the production of illegal drugs. The unit may also be required to provide security around the area to deny access to persons attempting to harvest drug crops or interfere with law enforcement activities. Integrating wartime METL into this scenario will tax the infantry commander's creativity. One opportunity to integrate unit METL tasks into counterdrug operations during crop eradication is to practice air assault, airborne, or foot march insertion techniques. This scenario also offers the opportunity to practice assembly area procedures, sustainment operations, and defense of the rear area. Once a unit commander is aware of his role in the counterdrug mission, he must conduct a commander's analysis to see what tasks are necessary to accomplish the counterdrug mission. The unit commander can prioritize those tasks and compare them with the tasks

from the external directives used to develop his current unit METL.

External directives help identify training tasks that relate to the unit's wartime mission.²⁹ One of the key external directives for infantry units is the Mission Training Plan. The Mission Training Plan provides the infantry unit commander with descriptive mission-oriented tasks that help the commander plan training the unit needs to perform critical wartime missions.³⁰

Since counterdrug operations may include tasks involving logistics, intelligence, or maneuver, it is important that unit commanders consider all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) when analyzing counterdrug missions. The BOS represents the major functions that occur on the battlefield. The systems are maneuver, fire support, command and control, intelligence, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support, and air defense. By systematically ensuring all BOS in his analysis, an infantry commander can ensure that all elements of the unit contribute to mission accomplishment.³¹

By examining the BOS one can identify several functions that are common to both wartime and counterdrug operations. The areas where there is the most crossover between conventional warfare and counterdrug operations are maneuver, intelligence, command and control, and

combat service support. Although the conditions are different, infantry commanders can integrate counterdrug missions into METL tasks that incorporate these Battlefield Operating Systems.

In the maneuver operating system there are several counterdrug tasks the commander can integrate into unit METL training. Units can take advantage of counterdrug operations to practice deployment. To conduct counterdrug operations the unit must draw and upload equipment, complete administrative preparation for the movement, assemble the force, and deploy to the area of operations. Commanders can also use the movement to practice alert procedures and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises.

Once the unit reaches the designated area of operations, the unit can practice tactical movement. Counterdrug operations offer an excellent opportunity for units to practice movement techniques, movement formations, and map reading skills. Units can also use counterdrug missions to practice infiltration techniques, assault techniques, motor marches, and road marches. These same skills support conventional infantry missions to assemble, deploy, and conduct combat operations.

While conducting counterdrug operations infantry units must execute the wartime task of conducting security operations. Drug organizations will undoubtedly

consider military forces a threat to their illegal activities. Consequently, military forces must be ready to conduct both passive and active security measures. The military chain of command must ensure that units training in a counterdrug environment are thoroughly familiar with rules of engagement and rules for the use of deadly force.

Counterdrug operations offer commanders and their staffs the opportunity to sharpen their skills in the area of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Staff members can practice Battlefield Area Analysis by gathering information on the weather and terrain throughout the area of operations. Staff members can also sharpen their skills on the analysis of enemy organization, equipment, and enemy courses of action by studying drug distribution organizations that will be operating in their area.

Infantry units can practice other wartime missions that contribute to intelligence, such as conducting reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance operations, during counterdrug operations. Once the unit staff identifies an area of interest, reconnaissance patrols can scout the area for any illegal activities, such as drug distribution, trafficking, or production, being carried out by illegal drug producers. The requirement to establish areas of interest and conduct reconnaissance

patrols during counterdrug operations is the same as it is for traditional combat missions such as defend or attack. Military units can also gain valuable experience in employing assets such as ground surveillance radars and night vision devices during these missions.

Conducting counterdrug operations will help infantry unit commanders and their staffs practice command and control skills. The commander will have to translate counterdrug missions into operation orders that explain the mission and training goals his subordinates are expected to conduct and evaluate. Elements of the unit can practice the communication skills necessary to report friendly movements and enemy contacts. Since the unit will most likely be providing direct support to a civilian authority, commanders will have a unique opportunity to teach their officers the importance of liaison duties. Maintaining liaison with the supported agency will allow the unit to practice a command and control skill often used during wartime while ensuring a unity of effort between the civilian organization and the military unit. This cooperation would also aid military and civilian organizations in understanding each other's needs, capabilities, and limitations. All METL tasks listed in Figure 2 require the commander and staff to be proficient at command and control.³²

Another BOS where infantry units can use counterdrug

operations to train on wartime tasks is combat service support. During counterdrug operations infantry units must be able to sustain themselves using organic elements as well as help from civilian support systems. Units will have to ensure troops have food, water, ammunition, and other basic needs. Commanders and their staffs must plan to sustain the unit by ensuring there are plans for unit resupply, medical care, and equipment repair and evacuation. External directives such as Mission Training Plans and ARTEPs list sustainment functions, such as medical care and resupply, as tasks to be evaluated when infantry units train for conventional combat operations.³³

In addition to unit training, infantry commanders can use counterdrug operations to train their staff sections on tasks from their METL that contribute to the accomplishment of both the counterdrug operation and the unit METL. Staff METLs define the tasks, conditions, and standards that staff sections must perform. Successful completion of wartime missions require infantry unit staffs to conduct mission analysis, implement the commander's decision, and prepare mission orders. Staff members must also forecast support requirements, plan and conduct sustainment operations, and displace unit tactical operations and rear operations centers.³⁴

During peacetime staff sections often operate from permanent facilities. They may also rely on support from civilian contracts that provide transportation, communications, and automation support. Unit commanders can opt to conduct counterdrug operations from field sites that simulate wartime bases of operations. By forcing the staff section to rely on their organic equipment the unit commander can integrate wartime realism into the counterdrug operations. Free from the distractions and extra duties often found in garrison, staff sections will have the opportunity to evaluate their proficiency in METL tasks and correct training deficiencies both during and after the operation. Unit commanders will have the opportunity to ensure that staff METL support the unit METL.

Junior leaders can use counterdrug operations to evaluate individual training. Individual training is the foundation of unit effectiveness in combat. Counterdrug missions can provide junior leaders the opportunity to ensure soldiers can perform the Military Occupational Specialty tasks related to their unit mission. It is imperative that unit commanders inform their junior leaders, to include noncommissioned officers, of the nature of the counterdrug mission and of the training they plan to conduct during the operation. Since many of the counterdrug missions will require infantry squads to

perform tasks such as forced march, defend, clear an area, and conduct a patrol, it is important that the squad leaders assist in development of plans to integrate wartime training into the counterdrug mission. The noncommissioned officers must ensure individual soldiers know what individual tasks to study prior to the mission and how those tasks will be evaluated in relation to the unit mission and unit training plans. This way all soldiers in the unit can contribute to the counterdrug mission and to the unit's preparation for combat.

Counterdrug missions also offer infantry commanders the opportunity to train and evaluate leadership tasks associated with unit METL. Leaders often spend so much time planning and directing the training of subordinates that they do not take time to evaluate and improve their own combat readiness. Counterdrug missions provide the infantry commander the chance to practice leader tasks such as:

- Conduct mission analysis
- Identify critical intelligence requirements
- Analyze friendly and enemy capabilities
- Select key terrain, routes, objectives, positions
- Organize the battlefield
- Develop plans based on mission analysis
- Disseminate plans and conduct rehearsals

These tasks are important to the successful completion of counterdrug operations identified in the preceding scenarios. They are the same tasks necessary for the commander and his staff, to complete successfully the combat critical tasks identified in the Army Training and Evaluation Program for Infantry Battalions.³⁰

Counterdrug operations provide the infantry commander the chance to hone his warfighting skills by integrating leader training into the counterdrug mission.

The conduct of counterdrug missions does not have to degrade unit readiness. With proper planning, counterdrug operations can assist infantry unit commanders in training for their wartime missions. The first step in gaining a positive training effect from counterdrug operations is to conduct a commander's analysis to see what tasks from the counterdrug mission mirror tasks and missions found in unit war plans and external directives.

Once a unit commander identifies the METL tasks he can train for during the counterdrug mission he should establish the standards and conditions necessary to ensure the training matches wartime expectations and evaluates unit proficiency as much as possible. External directives such as Mission Training Plans, Army Training and Evaluation Plans, and Soldiers Manuals provide valuable assistance in the development of standards and

conditions the unit can use for individual and collective training. They also define the parameters necessary to evaluate individual and unit performance.³⁰

Admittedly, not all counterdrug operations will provide the infantry unit commander the opportunity to conduct tough realistic training that helps prepare his unit for combat. Sometimes the counterdrug mission will be limited to providing classes on equipment or tactics. During these missions the commander may have to be satisfied with the improvement in individual skills gained by the soldiers teaching the classes.

Historically, counterdrug operations have proven beneficial to the training of infantry units. Two operations where Army infantry soldiers participated in counterdrug operations were Operation Blast Furnace and Operation Ghost Dancer. Both operations allowed the infantry soldiers to integrate conventional training into their counterdrug operation.

During Operation Blast Furnace an infantry platoon from 2nd Battalion 187th Infantry (Airborne) provided security for United States and Bolivian forces conducting raids on drugs labs in the Bolivian Jungle. The infantry unit involved in the operation deployed from Panama to Bolivia. The operational concept of Blast Furnace was to use fixed rear facilities and establish forward operating bases from which Bolivian forces could raid suspected

cocaine laboratories. During the six months in Bolivia the infantry soldiers assigned to the Task Force conducted weapons training, helped protect the rear area, and provided security for the law enforcement agents conducting the raids. Although the soldiers were not involved in a firefight, they received realistic training on air assault operations, mission analysis, intelligence analysis, and logistics planning.³⁷

During Operation Ghost Dancer, soldiers from the 9th Infantry Division assisted the Bureau of Land Management in eradicating illegal drugs in the State of Oregon. During the operation the infantry soldiers deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington and occupied camps in the Oregon forests. The soldiers then conducted reconnaissance patrols to locate and destroy marijuana being grown in the forests. Operation Ghost Dancer allowed the soldiers to practice tasks such as movement, reconnaissance, command and control, and sustainment. Although this training was conducted during a counterdrug operation it is directly related to the tasks found in infantry unit METLs.³⁸

Many of the management and execution functions necessary to conduct counterdrug missions parallel the tasks and skills necessary to conduct wartime missions. Consequently, infantry commanders can use counterdrug operations to train to meet their wartime mission

requirements. By carefully adjusting counterdrug mission scenarios to reflect wartime missions, infantry commanders can establish tasks, conditions, and standards for counterdrug missions that reflect the tasks on his unit METL. He can then use the counterdrug mission to train and evaluate his unit's ability to execute selected tasks.

Although counterdrug missions may not offer the opportunity to engage targets or close with and destroy the enemy, infantry units can still practice tasks that support conventional combat operations. Units can practice deployment, reconnaissance and security, tactical movement, and sustainment during counterdrug missions. Counterdrug operations also allow infantry units to conduct collective training. Infantry commanders can plan and conduct training that helps prepare individuals, small units, staff sections, and leaders for the tasks they will need to accomplish in combat. This not only complements wartime METL, it helps the unit train the way the Army plans to fight.

IV. Conclusion

Congress passed the first law against drug trafficking on 23 February 1887. The purpose of the law was to discourage the use of opium. The law prohibited

the importing of opium into the United States and made it a crime for United States citizens to traffic the drug in China. Undoubtedly, Congress realized that drug abuse was a threat to individual citizens and to the society as a whole.³⁹

The duty of our armed forces is to provide for the common defense of the nation. Until now, congress has limited this duty to combat against foreign military aggression at home or overseas. Today senior military leaders and their subordinates must be able extend their training and their thinking to defending the country against threats to our national security caused by the flow of illegal drugs. In other words, they must be prepared to combat non-military threats to our national security.

During the Reagan administration Defense Secretaries Carlucci and Weinberger advised the President that increasing military involvement in the drug war would reduce combat readiness and undermine the military's primary mission of defending the country. A Rand Corporation study supported the secretaries' stance on the military's role in drug interdiction efforts. Rand's National Research Institute was pessimistic that the diversion of military resources could be effective in reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.⁴⁰

However, Congress and the President have refused to back down on the use of the military in the drug war. The President and the Congress are sending a new message to the drug cartels; the rules involving the use of military force in the drug war have changed. The United States will help friendly governments that want our help and, when requested, will make available the appropriate resources of America's armed forces to assist in drug law enforcement activities.⁴¹

The military now has the responsibility and funding to conduct counterdrug operations when they are requested by competent authorities responsible for war on drugs. As part of the 1989 Defense Authorization Act, Congress gave the Department of Defense \$300 million to expand its drug interdiction mission. The 1990 federal appropriations increased the funding to \$450 million.⁴²

One positive finding of the Rand study, concerning the use of military resources to support drug interdiction programs, was military resources were available and responsive when drug law enforcement agencies legally requested military support.⁴³ Based on guidance from the Secretary of defense, both USSOUTHCOM and FORSCOM have plans for a substantial effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs in the United States and in cooperative foreign countries. Consequently, infantry unit commanders should not be

surprised if they are asked to support civilian law enforcement agencies that are conducting counterdrug operations at home or abroad. Training agents, assisting in the command and control of operations, providing security, gathering intelligence, and canalizing movement are legitimate missions for infantry units supporting civilian authorities. Infantry commanders must realize that counterdrug operations are legitimate missions that support the defense of the American way of life. By incorporating counterdrug missions into conventional infantry unit METL, the prudent commander can effectively train his unit on wartime tasks while conducting counterdrug missions.

Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, states that training is the Army's top priority. The Army's training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight and win in combat. Former Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vouno described training as the cornerstone of readiness and the top priority for the total Army. Effective training is the number one priority of the Army's senior leadership during peacetime.⁴⁴ Since all soldiers have sworn to support and defend this country against conventional and unconventional threats, infantry commanders must make the maximum use of every opportunity to train those soldiers to deter war, to fight and control wars that do start,

and terminate those wars on terms favorable to United States and allied interests. Counterdrug operations provide infantry commanders and their soldiers another opportunity to train to win in combat.

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